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GOD, THE DEMON, AND 
THE STATUS OF THEODICIES 
Edward Stein 
THE problem of evil is an ancient one for theists. 
How is it possible for an omnipotent, omnisci-
ent, omnibenevolent being to exist in a world which 
clearly contains evil? A major element of every 
theistic philosophy is a theodicy, an attempt to 
reconcile this apparent contradiction. Steven Cahn, 
Edward Madden and Peter Hare discuss a series of 
concepts isomorphic to the traditional theistic 
notions of God, the problem of evil, and theodicies 
with an eye towards raising problems for theism. 1 
These concepts relate to a malevolent, rather than 
a benevolent, deity, not a god, but a demon. In 
this paper, I will argue that the notion of a demon 
is far more powerful than these three philosophers 
have suggested; in fact, arguments based on the 
demon create serious problems for the entire project 
of giving a rational defense of theism. 
Atheists frequently raise the problem of evil as a 
challenge to proofs for the existence of an omnipo-
tent, omniscient, wholly good supernatural being. 
The argument from evil asserts that it would be in-
consistent for an all-knowing, all-powerful , all-
good god to exist in the same world as evil: if God is 
really all-powerful, then he could prevent evil; if 
God is really all-good, then he would prevent evil. 
In response to this argument, theists have developed 
theodicies, attempts to explain away this apparent 
inconsistency. Atheists try to find flaws in many of 
these theodicies, and thus the debate over the prob-
lem of evil persists, with no acknowledged victor. 
Cahn, Madden and Hare have a strategy for ex-
panding this debate. They ask us to consider the 
possibility of an omnimalevolent supernatural being, 
which I shall call the demon. I shall call someone 
who believes in the demon a demonist. How might 
someone who does not believe in the existence of 
the demon (an ademonist) argue that the demon does 
not exist? The ademonist could make an argument 
from good by offering illustrative examples of the 
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overwhelming goodness in the world, thereby chal-
lenging the demonist to explain how the existence 
of the demon is consistent with such goodness. The 
demonist can offer a variety of responses to the 
problem of good which I shall call demonodicies, 
dispensing with, for reasons of aesthetics and sym-
metry, Cahn' s term "cacodaemonodicies." The 
demonist may say that good provides a necessary 
contrast to evil. Or she might offer a free will de-
fense of demonism, arguing that the demon, in order 
to maximize the amount of evil in the world, gave 
people free will, knowing that although they would 
sometimes choose good acts, the evil acts which 
they committed would be worse than merely prede-
termined evil acts. Finally, the demonist could al-
ways fall back on the "last defense" that human 
beings, in their limited frame of reference, may 
think there is good in the world, but that the demon, 
who can see the entire picture, knows that in the long 
run , all apparently good things are, in fact, evil. 
Cahn, Madden and Hare have argued that the 
demonist can construct a demonodicy which is 
isomorphic with any theodicy. I agree in general-
this can be accomplished simply by substituting 
the word "good" for the word "evil" and the words 
"a demon" for the word "God." This inversion 
process will produce a demonodicy for every theod-
icy. Since the demonist can use inversion to create 
demonodicies which are analogous to theodicies, 
the problems of good and evil are isomorphic-both 
are either soluble or insoluble. This is the 
interesting point which Cahn, Madden and Hare 
make. I want, however, to take the notion of a 
demon and use it to make a deeper and stronger 
argument than one that merely establishes that 
every theodicy is in the same boat with its isomor-
phic demonodicy. My strategy is to move from a 
theodicy, which is an argument that God is consis-
tent with the amount of evil in the world, to an 
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argument for the actual existence of a supernatural 
being with certain attributes. I want to argue that 
any theist who puts forth an argument for the exist-
ence of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevo-
lent god has three tasks before her: argue for the 
possible existence of God, argue for the consistency 
of God with the amount of evil in the world, and 
show that these arguments are not invertible into 
isomorphic arguments for the existence and consis-
tency of a demon (a task which I think that no 
current theist has accomplished). In other words, 
I am emphasizing that arguments for the consis-
tency and existence of God must include arguments 
against the existence and consistency of the demon. 
To begin, I shall divide the arguments for the 
existence of God into two categories: ethical argu-
ments and ontological arguments. Ethical arguments 
are those that attempt to prove the ethical nature 
(i.e., the goodness or badness) of an omniscient and 
omnipotent being. Ethical arguments (not to be con-
fused with argument in ethics), to be successful, 
must explain away any apparent contradictions be-
tween the ethical nature of the relevant supernatural 
being and the perceived amount of good (in the case 
of the demon) or evil (in the case of God) in the 
world. In contrast, ontological arguments are those 
that attempt to prove that an omnipotent, omniscient 
being exists. The theist and the demonist may agree 
on ontological arguments, for they both believe in 
the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient being. 
They are, however, at odds with respect to ethical 
arguments. This is where the isomorphism enters 
the picture: any ethical argument of the theist can be 
inverted into an ethical argument for the demonist. 
Because of this isomorphism, no ethical argument 
for the existence of a benevolent supernatural being 
provides any reason for thinking that such a being 
exists rather than a malevolent one. Where there is 
isomorphism, there are no ethical arguments that 
successfully establish either the goodness of God or 
the badness of a demon. The theist wants to argue 
for the existence of God, but his ethical arguments 
are isomorphic with ethical arguments for a demon. 
This isomorphism in effect neutralizes the theist's 
(and, for that matter, the demonist's) ethical argu-
ments. Without successful ethical arguments, the 
theist has no successful arguments for the existence 
of God. The theist's arguments will fail unless they 
demonstrate not only that God is compatible with this 
world, but that the demon is not similarly compatible. 
A possible response to this approach would be to 
deny that arguments about supernatural beings can 
be neatly divided between ethical and ontologi-
cal arguments; there might be "hybrid" arguments 
which are both ethical and ontological. My response 
would be to distinguish between the ethical conse-
quences of each premise of an argument and its o~-
tological consequences. The theist and the demonist 
would argue for the same ontological consequences 
but they would argue for different (though isomor-
phic) ethical consequences. This would preserve 
the above result that the theist's arguments ( even if 
they were "hybrid" arguments) would fail to ac-
complish the third task facing the theist, namely 
showing that theistic arguments are not invertible 
into isomorphic demonistic arguments. 
While Cahn, Madden and Hare only conclude 
that the arguments from evil and good are of the 
same status, my conclusion amounts to a rejection 
of all current versions of theism on the grounds that 
they do not show that the demon is not similarly 
compatible with the amount of evil in the world; in 
other words, no current version of theism makes 
successful arguments about the ethical nature of the 
supernatural being that theists claim exists. For 
theism to succeed, there must be an argument that 
God is consistent with the amount of good and evil 
in the world, while the demon is not. In other words, 
theism requires a non-invertible ethical argument 
and an associated theodicy, something which no 
current version of it offers. This is not to say that 
a complete and strong version of theism is impos-
sible; rather, it is a claim that no such version of 
theism has been suggested thus far and a challenge 
to theists to try to suggest one. 
One objection to this strategy, similar to one 
made by John King-Farlow2 , is that a theistic answer 
to the problem of evil tries to establish the consis-
tency of God with the amount of evil in the world, 
not that there is a high probability that God exists. 
The objection claims that Cahn, Madde.n and Hare 
pose no threat to theodicies because they show only 
that demonodicies are successful if theodicies are, 
not that theodicies are unsuccessful. Theodicies are 
designed to show that the existence of God and evil 
in the same world is consistent; showing that a 
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demon and good can also exist consistently in the 
same world does no damage to the force of 
theodicies. The objection is right that the 
isomorphism argument does not, by itself, disprove 
the existence of God, and that, as far as the conclu-
sion reached by Cahn, Madden and Hare is con-
cerned, the theist is safe. That is, their arguments 
show that if God's existence is consistent with the 
amount of good and evil in the world, then so is 
the demon's. The objection does not show, how-
ever, that nothing more can be accomplished by 
the isomorphism argument. In fact, I argued above 
that the isomorphism blocks both the theist and the 
demonist from making successful ethical argu-
ments. This objection does, however, nicely show 
the difference between the conclusion of Cahn, 
Madden and Hare that theism and demonism are 
equally plausible and my conclusion that no cur-
rently espoused version of theism is adequate since 
none makes any successful ethical arguments. 
A more specific objection concerns the invertibil-
ity of the free will theodicy . Cahn offers a sketch of 
the free will demonodicy, one of the demonist' s pos-
sible responses to the problem of good. According 
to this inversion, in order to achieve the maximum 
amount of evil, the demon has given human beings 
free will so that they can choose to act evilly. A 
world containing only people who freely choose to 
do evil would be more evil than a world in which 
people were predetermined always to do evil. The 
world under the demon is thus "a place of 'soul-
breaking, • in which free human beings, by grappling 
with the exhausting tasks and challenges of their 
existence [can] have their spirits broken" (Cahn, 
p. 72). In response to the ademonist challenge that 
the evil in the world does not nullify all the good, 
the demonist, using the free will demonodicy, could 
respond by referring to future evil so great that all 
previous good used to set the stage for it would be 
nullified. Finally, if asked why the demon does 
not reveal himself to the world, the demonist can 
explain that the demon needs epistemic distance in 
order to trick us into believing there is hope for 
better times. 
This account is, however, open to the objection 
that the free will theodicy cannot be successfully 
inverted . The structure of the free will demonodicy 
can be laid out as follows: 
(I) It is worse for people to choose to act evilly than 
it is if they are predetermined to act evilly. 
(2) Therefore, if the demon wants to maximize evil , 
he should give people free will. 
But this demonodicy contains the following 
implicit assumption: 
(3) If any undesired good is generated by the demon 
giving people free will, it will be cancelled out 
by the evil generated when people act evilly. 
While (2) follows from (1) and (3), it does not 
follow from (1) alone, because if (3) is false, the 
free will demonodicy will not work since if free will 
makes the world a better one, then the demon would 
not choose to give people free will. Thus, if (3) if 
false, then the apparent contradiction of having the 
demon and good existing in the same world is not 
explained. 
Under what conditions might (3) be false? (3) 
might be false if: 
(4a) Free will is intrinsically good. 
If (4a) is true, then the free will demonodicy 
will fail to be isomorphic with the free will theod-
icy, for the free will theodicy need not consider 
the possibility that the intrinsic goodness of free 
will might cancel out the evil caused by people 
who freely choose evil acts. There are two other 
possible situations which might hold with respect 
to free will, namely: 
( 4b) Free will is intrinsically evil. 
(4c) Free will is neither intrinsically good nor intrin-
sically evil , i.e, free will is neutral. 
The intuitions of most people favor (4a); that is, 
most people believe that free will is good. Weighing 
all the respective merits of the (4)'s is beyond the 
scope of this article. I will therefore attempt only 
to examine the relevant consequences of (4a), (4b) 
and (4c), remaining agnostic about which is true. 
If ( 4c) is true, then the isomorphism between· 
the free will theodicy and the free will demonodicy 
holds. But, if (4a) is true, then the isomorphism 
may be threatened, because if free will is intrinsi-
cally good, then the free will demonodicist will 
have to show that the evil created by having people 
opt for evil is greater than the intrinsic good of just 
having free will . This is not to say that the free will 
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demonodicist would be unable to do so; the crucial 
point, however, is that the free will theodicist will 
not have this same problem, because the intrinsic 
good of free will (if (4a) is true) will not cancel 
out or take away from the good created by having 
people opt for good-quite the opposite, in fact. 
An isomorphic problem will occur if (4b) is true. 
If free will is intrinsically evil, then the free will 
demonodicy and the free will theodicy will fail to 
be isomorphic for almost the same reasons they 
fail to be so if (4a) is true. Namely, the free will 
theodicy will have the problem that the good which 
people commit freely might be cancelled out by 
the intrinsic evil of free will, a problem the free 
will demonodicy will not have. By arguing for 
either (4a) or (4b), one could claim that the 
isomorphism fails between the free will theodicy 
and the free will demonodicy. 
Despite this objection, I think there are two ways 
in which the isomorphism between the free will 
theodicy and the free will demonodicy can be pre-
served. First, the isomorphism is preserved if, for 
the same reason, both strategies fail to explain away 
the apparent contradictions which are pointed out 
by the arguments from evil and good. The free will 
theodicy might fail because God could have chosen 
to actualize a world (call it W1) in which people 
have free will and they always choose to perform 
good actions. Being omniscient and thus being able 
to survey all possible worlds, God had the ability 
to choose any world from among an infinite number 
of possible worlds. Why should he have chosen 
the actual world, a world in which people freely 
choose to act evilly, when he could have actualized 
a world where people always choose to act good? 
If God is really all-good, then he would have chosen 
to actualize world W1 . But clearly he did not (since 
people do choose to act evilly in this world), there-
fore the problem of evil remains. Similarly, the 
free will demonodicy might fail because the demon 
could have actualized the world in which people 
have free will and they always choose to act evilly 
(call it W2 ). The demon also was able to choose 
among an infinite number of possible worlds. If 
he is really all-evil, he would have chosen to 
actualize world W2 . But clearly he did not, (since 
people do perform good acts), and therefore the 
problem of good remains. If both strategies fail for 
the reasons above, then the free will theodicy is 
invertible and the isomorphism is preserved despite 
the objection that the free will theodicy is not inver-
tible. There are arguments, however, against this 
approach to the free will theodicy and settling this 
specific issue about free will and supernatural 
beings is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Fortunately, I think that there is a better way to 
preserve the isomorphism. To review the present 
status of the argument, I am considering whether the 
free will demonodicy is really isomorphic with the 
free will theodicy. The particular issue under con-
sideration is whether free will is intrinsically good. 
If free will is intrinsically good, then the isomorph-
ism between the free will demonodicy and the free 
will theodicy will fail because the demonodicy will 
have to deal with the possibility that the good of 
having free will might cancel out the evil created by 
people choosing to act evilly. This failure threatens 
to break down the general isomorphism between 
theodicies and demonodicies. 
Underlying this argument against the invertibility 
of the free will theodicy is the assumption that free 
will must be all or nothing. But I think this is false. 
We can certainly make sense of varying degrees of 
free will. For example, while we may be freely-
choosing beings in some sense, clearly we cannot 
choose our biological parents and we cannot control 
our subconscious. But God or the demon could have 
given us such powers. We can imagine a world 
where agents have a much greater amount of free 
will and can control, for example, their subcon-
scious. (The examples do not particularly matter-
what does matter is that there can be varying degrees 
of free will.) Since there can be varying degrees of 
free will, I think the isomorphism can be saved, 
because while the demonist may have to explain 
why the demon granted people some amount of 
free will, the theist will have the opposite problem: 
why did God not grant people complete free will 
or at least make them freer than he actually did? 
If a person had more free will then he does in the 
actual world and he chose to do good, this would 
be an even greater good than a person with less 
free will choosing to do so. The general point is 
that the free will theodicist and the free will 
demonodicist, if they admit that there is evil and 
good in the world and if they use free will to explain 
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how evil and good can exist in the same world 
with God (or the demon), both have the additional 
burden of explaining why the creator gave peo-
ple the particular amount of free will that he did. 
For this reason, the isomorphism is preserved. 
In conclusion, I have argued, with Cahn, 
Madden and Hare, there is a demonodicy isomor-
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
phic to every theodicy and that the problems of 
good and evil are either both soluble or both 
insoluble. Further, I have argued that this iso-
morphism threatens all current versions of theism 
(and demonism) because it blocks all known 
arguments for the goodness of a supernatural 
being.3 
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